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RESUME. Cet article a pour objectif de mettre en relation les concepts 
d’efficacité et de crise bancaire. Cette mise en parallèle trouve sa justification 
dans la théorie des cycles économiques selon laquelle une crise est le point de 
retournement à partir duquel l’économie retrouve une phase de croissance. 
Théoriquement, les crises bancaires sont censées éliminer les mauvaises 
banques et de fait permettre au système de fonctionner de manière plus 
efficace après la crise. Dès lors, si l’efficacité de l’industrie bancaire joue un rôle 
dans l’apparition de problèmes bancaires, la période d’après crise devrait 
s’accompagner d’une amélioration de l’efficacité des banques. Nous testons 
cette hypothèse sur les crises bancaires turque de 1994 et indonésienne de 1997 
en utilisant la méthode des frontières stochastiques. Nous trouvons que 
l’efficacité ne s’améliore pas après la crise, au contraire les banques semblent 
plus inefficaces. 
 
JEL Classification: G14, G21, G28, G34 
Mots clés : crise bancaire, efficacité, Indonésie, Turquie. 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Drawing together the concepts of inefficiency and banking crisis is 
directly inspired by business cycles theory where a crisis is the turning point 
from which the market/economy is recovering. If inefficiency plays a role in 
the occurrence of banking crisis, the post-crisis period should be the time for 
recovering efficiency. Moreover, traditional banking theory predicts that the 
crisis should eliminate bad banks from the system, leading to a more efficient 
banking sector. We tested this hypothesis on the 1994 Turkish and 1997 
Indonesian banking crises using stochastic cost frontier analysis. Our results 
show an interesting pattern, opposed to what theory predicts: we find that 
inefficiency increase after the crises in both banking sectors. 
 
Classification JEL : G14, G21, G28, G34 
Key words: Banking crisis, Efficiency, Indonesia, Turkey. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1990s financial crises led economists to rethink completely their approach 
toward monetary and banking crises (see the survey by Cartapanis, 2002). The 
International Monetary Funds (IMF, 1998) emphasized that between 1985 and 
1995, more than 130 of its members experienced serious banking problems. 
The 1980s financial markets liberalization in emerging countries is generally 
blamed as a significant source of instability (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995; 
Griffith-Jones, 1998; Scialom, 2004). Therefore, inefficiency may be 
consequently one of the major causes of 1990s banking problems, and should 
be a concern for policy makers (Resti, 1997). Indeed, inefficiency can be 
regarded as socially beneficial as it reduces the cost of financial intermediation 
for consumers (Matthews and Tripe, 2004). Thus greater amount, at better 
price and quality, are intermediated from savers to producers, enhancing 
investment and offering greater safety and returns for shareholders (Berger, 
Hunter and Timme, 1993). 
 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to asses whether a banking crisis can 
improve banking sector’s efficiency? Our point comes from business cycles 
theory, where a crisis is the turning point from which the market/economy is 
recovering. In that spirit, if inefficiency plays a role in the occurrence of 
banking problems, the post-crisis period should be the time of recovering, as 
bad banks should have been taken over the market. Consequently, we also 
investigate the idea that efficiency should increase during the period following 
the crisis. To test this hypothesis, we look at the 1994 Turkish and 1997 
Indonesian crises. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II defines both 
concepts of banking crisis and efficiency, and asses the interaction between the 
two in the cases of Indonesia and Turkey. Section III presents the sample and 
the econometric methodology. Section IV describes and analyzes the results. 
Section V concludes and offers some policy recommendations. 
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2. The role of efficiency in banking crises 
 
2.1. Banking crises 
 
While each banking crisis has its own dynamics, most of the main components 
remain identical. These common causes have been pointed out by Calomiris 
and Gorton (1991), and for the special case of emerging economies by 
Goldstein and Turner (1996). They listed the possible causes for banking crises 
as follow: (i) Both external and domestic macroeconomic volatility, (ii) Lending 
booms, asset price collapses and surges in capital inflows, (iii) Increasing bank 
liabilities with large maturity/currency mismatches, (iv) Inadequate preparation 
for financial liberalization, (v) Heavy government involvement and loose 
controls on connected lending, (vi) Weaknesses in the accounting, disclosure 
and legal framework, (vii) Distorted incentives for bank owners, managers, 
bank depositors and supervisors, (viii) Exchange rate regimes. The last 20 years 
exhibited one common feature: financial liberalization and more precisely the 
difficulties faced by banks in a global banking market (Edwards and Mishkin, 
1995; Griffith-Jones, 1998; Scialom, 2004). 
 
Building on these elements, banking crises can be divided into two 
categories: microeconomic and macroeconomic. Our study focuses on the 
microeconomic level so the macro level will only be shortly presented, before 
turning to our point. 
 
The macroeconomic level refers to a bad operating environment. Banking 
crises can arise from macroeconomic problems, the latter being external to the 
banking system. Even well-run banking systems operating in a strong legal and 
regulatory framework can be hit by an unstable macroeconomic environment. 
The literature revealed a lot of macro problems that can be sources of banking 
crisis: lending booms, possibly fuelled by excessive capital inflows or changes 
in tax rules, real estate and/or equity price bubbles, business downturns, 
growing excess capacity/falling profitability in real sector, rising fiscal and/or 
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current account deficits, weakened public debt sustainability, sharp changes in 
exchange rates and real interest rates, etc. 
 
The microeconomic level refers to bad banking. Banking crises are often 
linked to weak bank operations: poor lending practices, excessive risk taking, 
deficient governance, lack of internal controls, focus on market share rather 
than profitability, and currency and maturity mismatches in the banks 
themselves or among their borrowers. In some emerging countries, these 
conditions may be worsened when bank ownership is very narrow. In these 
circumstances, bad banking refers mostly to bad lending, connected lending, 
insider operations, and outright fraud may go hand in hand with impunity. 
Similarly, state banks may be run as quasi-fiscal agencies based on political 
criteria with disregard for commercial principles, undermining their solvency 
and the soundness of other better-run banks. Bad banking can only persist in 
the absence of proper regulation and supervision, and of adequate market 
discipline. Supervisors may also lack authority and the sufficient skilled staff. 
Expectation of depositors and creditors bailouts is also a well-known source of 
moral hazard problems that distort incentives, and thus efficiency. 
 
Finally, the distinction between macro- and micro-founded banking crisis 
can be sometime uneasy. Financial liberalization can be classified in both 
categories as it influences banks managers and government behaviour and 
interact between them. In other words, government liberalise banking markets 
without adapting the legal framework (macro), inducing a distortion of banks’ 
owners and managers incentives (micro). 
 
Banks efficiency should be a serious concern for policy makers. First 
because the banking industry “has been obsessed with efficiency over the last 
decade” (Klinkerman, 2003). Second because banking crises can be very costly 
(table 1), depending mostly on the way public authorities manage it. 
Conventional academic wisdom acknowledges that a banking authority with a 
strong budget constraint will solve a banking crisis more quickly than a soft 
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budget constrained authority3. It has been theoretically shown that a soft 
budget constraint induces no discrimination between ‘good-efficient’ and ‘bad-
inefficient’ banks when bailing out the sector. At the opposite, a strong budget 
constraint induces that the authority to close the banks. Therefore, recovering 
time will vary in this respect. An interesting and surprising result can be found 
in the IMF 1998’s World Economic Outlook: emerging economies are more 
likely to be affected by banking problems than industrialised ones, but the 
average recovering delay is greater in industrialised countries (table 2). 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 1: Budgetary cost of banking crises 
-------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 2: Banking crises and average recovering delay 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
2.2. Efficiency  
 
Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998) summarise conceptual and measurement 
problems induced by the concept of operating efficiency inspired by the work 
of Farrell (1957) which defines it as cost minimising and profit maximising 
production process. Economic efficiency arises from technical and allocative 
efficiency. The former refers to an over-utilisation of some inputs and the 
latter refers to a bad combination of inputs comparing to their relative prices. 
Addressing this problem in emerging markets allows us to refer to the concept 
of efficiency as typically in these economies, credit is overproduced and 
personal, capital and funds are badly used to produce it for the reasons listed 
before. 
The way we asses efficiency is generally represented by some form of 
parametric and non-parametric frontiers. Firms’ efficiency is then defined in 
terms of their relative distance from the efficient frontier which becomes 
therefore the benchmark for optimum performance. Many comprehensive 
studies raised important problematic regarding banks operations. Banking 
efficiency literature in the United States, European Countries and also Eastern 
                                                 
3 For a stylised model, see Huang and Xu (2000). 
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European Countries provided a substantial number of studies with different 
methodologies. Some researches dealing with efficiency in US Banking found 
that banks could cut their cost and improve  their profit efficiency more by 
reducing frontier inefficiencies rather than by reducing some optimal level of 
scale and scope economies to minimize average cost and profit efficiency 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1991 and 1997, Berger and Mester, 1997). Still working 
on US banks, DeYoung and Nolle (1996) found that foreign banks are 
relatively less efficient than domestic banks. Other studies, like Turati (2001), 
noted that the higher the cost efficiency, the higher the level of profits a bank 
will earn. He did not found, over 250 European commercial banks from 1992 
to 1999, any striking difference in average efficiency among European 
countries. Sheldon (1999) used unconsolidated data for 1,783 commercial and 
savings banks in the EU, Norway, and Switzerland for the period 1993-1997 
and finds that larger banks, specialized banks and retail banks are more cost 
and profit efficient than small banks, diversified banks and wholesale banks, 
respectively. Using Turkish banks, Jackson et al. (1998) found that competition 
among banks is important for the banking performance and efficiency. Relying 
on these results, some authors assumed that banks across different countries 
access equally to the same banking technology. Others concluded that 
efficiency results can not be compared across borders because each country 
has specific features, such as regulatory powers, demography, and economic 
conditions (Bos & Schimiedel, 2003). 
All these studies raised concerns about important features of the 
production process and economic problematic, but few have investigated the 
implication of inefficiency on banking crises. 
 
2.3. Banking crises in Indonesia and Turkey 
 
Both Turkish and Indonesian States were strongly involved in the financial 
sector management, until the end of the 70s for Turkey and the 80s for 
Indonesia. Policymakers relied mainly on imports-substitution strategies. Such 
policies aimed at ensuring countries self-sufficiency, by the means of 
protection against international competition, including protection of the 
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banking industry. After the 80s oil crashes, the development strategies changed 
for these countries, turning to promote exports and financial markets 
liberalization. 
 
The International Monetary Funds (IMF) stabilisation programs imposed 
Turkish financial sector liberalisation. Following the financial crisis of the late 
1970s, the program aimed at increasing the rate of saving and channelling 
resources towards more efficient activities. This program was designed to 
constrain banking sector to fund country’s development. Banks developed 
their structures, bought many financial institutions, as well as investment 
banks. In a similar way, Indonesian financial liberalization initiated on June 
1983 led to the suppression of interest rate controls and credit ceilings for 
banks, thus lifting legal lending limit. The purpose was to convert the financial 
framework from a state dominated system into a market based one. However, 
the insufficient regulatory frame was unable to control the destabilising effects 
of markets opening. Indeed, these deregulations did not train long term capital 
inflows (i.e. FDI) as shown in figure 1. In 2000, Turkey was ranked 52nd row 
among the countries recipient of FDI. Indonesia was in an even worse 
situation following the UNCTAD report, during 1999-2001, with the 138th 
position. Banks were therefore forced to fund them elsewhere, improving 
competition and risk behaviour (i.e. liquid/speculative funds).  
 
-------------------------------------- 
Figure 1: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
-------------------------------------- 
 
The liberalization process led both countries to some structural weaknesses 
listed below. 
 
Insufficient capitalisation 
Stockholders' equity remained low because law made it possible to open a bank 
with little funds, from approximately US$ 30 millions for Turkey. In Indonesia, 
the deregulation of October 1988, made possible to create a new bank with 
even lower capital (only 10 milliard Rupiah, i.e. around US$ 4 millions). 
Moreover, taxes and chronic hyperinflation in those countries did not 
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encourage banks-owners to increase their own capital stocks. Figure 2 
highlights the weakness of owned capital stocks in both Turkish and 
Indonesian systems. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Figure 2: Net Working Capital/Total Assets 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Degradation of credits quality 
The credits quality decreased because of illegal appropriations, concentration 
of risks and insufficient provisions. Figure 3 emphasises banking assets 
weakness. The bad credits quality is even more obvious when considering the 
ratio of unproductive loans. To offset their losses, banks artificially increased 
the value of their underperforming assets (by making calculation with book- 
and not market-values for example), in order to meet prudential ratios. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Figure 3: Permanent assets (PA)/Total assets and Non-performing loans (NPL)/Total loans 
-------------------------------------- 
 
A large exposure  
Financial liberalization led banks in both countries to large exchange and 
interest rates exposures (FX open positions, maturity mismatch) involving a 
volatile and limited profitability. Undoubtedly, mismanagement is to be held as 
responsible, as well as banking authorities. Maturity mismatch made the sector 
more vulnerable to liquidity shocks, just like the FX open positions weakened 
the sector vis-à-vis the external shocks. Figures 4 and 5 respectively show 
liquidity levels and losses trained by FX open positions. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Figure 4: Liquid assets/Total assets (%) 
-------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------- 
Figure 5: Interests expenses/Non-interests expenses (%) 
-------------------------------------- 
 
In terms of returns over equity (RoE) and over assets (RoA), Turkish banks 
look less more profitable than foreign banks. In Indonesia, state-owned banks 
were very unprofitable and even private- and foreign-owned banks seem to 
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have suffered during the second half of the 1990s. Table 3 shows all the details. 
On the overall, state-owned banks are less profitable, which is not surprising.  
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 3: RoE/RoA ratios 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Small sizes and fragmented structures 
After having passed from 43 banks in 1980 to 66 in 1990, the banking sector 
counted 79 banks in 2000. On the 74 active banks in 2000 (5 were put under 
supervision of the Funds of Guaranteed Saving and Deposits, TMSF), 56 are 
deposit banks, the remaining 18 being banks of investment. Among the 
deposit banks, 4 are stat-owned, 26 are Turkish banks, 18 are foreign-owned 
and 8 are under supervision of the TMSF. For Indonesia, before 1990, banks 
were dominated by the State and big private banks. Based on October 
1988deregulation, private and foreign banks accessed the market easily. Table 4 
shows the fragmentation of banking sector structure for both countries. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 4: Structure banking sectors 1990/2000 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Inadequate supervision 
Banking sectors are characterized by both an internal and external inadequate 
supervision, due mainly to the lack of transparency. The Turkish banks used to 
window-dress their balance sheets, either using accountancy tricks in 
overestimating the value of the permanent credits compared to their market 
prices, or quite simply by playing with the inflation and exchange rates. 
In Indonesia, the lack of supervision trained a sharp increase of 
underperforming credits. The economic crisis showed that banks were 
vulnerable mainly because of high NPLs. Because of inadequate supervision, 
only little banks declared their real NPL positions, especially because of the 
lack of legal sanctions from monetary authorities. 
On the overall, both banking sectors were dominated by the States. The 
liberalizations have weakened banking industries, worsening bad banking 
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behaviours. Thus, coming to our hypothesis, we expect an increase of 
inefficiency before and a decrease after the crisis.4
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
There are five ways to asses efficiency; two non-parametric approaches: data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and free disposal hull (FDH); and three 
parametric estimation methods: stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), free 
distribution analysis (DFA) and thick frontier analysis (TFA). 
 
We build a translogarythmic cost function to estimate a stochastic cost 
frontier (SFA) for each of our panel using log-Likelihood estimation. The use 
of a cost instead of a production function is due to the assumption that banks 
in Indonesia and Turkey were strictly following profit maximization strategies, 
which can not be robustly satisfied during the sample period. Moreover, 
because of Governments’ soft budgets constraints, outputs levels could have 
been exogenously driven. These assumptions lead us to reject a production 
approach. A cost function was preferred under the assumptions of exogenous 
output and input prices. The competitiveness of banking industry for both 
countries suggests that banks competed for their input price and not only on 
output side. Finally, a cost function allows us to consider more than a unique 
output. We introduce the inputs/outputs choice in the next section. 
 
Largely used in related literature, the translog cost function surpasses other 
functions (like Cobb-Douglas, CES, Leontieff, etc.) thanks to its flexible form. 
The use of the SFA method is mainly motivated by the fact that non-
parametric approaches do not consider noise in the estimation. The fact that 
we are actually looking at emerging economies means a more unstable 
economic environment and idiosyncratic shocks can not be omitted. 
                                                 
4 We did not account for pure ‘sun spots’ crisis. Both banking crises showed strong structural 
components and it has never been argued, to our best knowledge, that Indonesian and Turkish 
crises were due to ‘sun spots’. See Bhattacharya and Jacklin (1998) for a more formal 
distinction. 
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Moreover, it has been shown that SFA method is more robust for bigger 
samples (Coelli, Rao and Battese, 1998).5
 
The benchmark equation can then be represented as follows (usual 
restrictions apply): 
 
3 2 3 3
0
1 1 1 1
1ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
2it j itj k itk jl itj itlj k j l
tc w y w wα α β α
= = = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑∑  
2 2 3 2
1 1 1 1
1 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
2 km itk itm jk itj itk itk m j k
y y w yβ δ ε
= = = =
+ +∑∑ ∑∑ +
 
 
where, for the  panel of banks at time t, ( ) are the price of inputs, ( ) 
the outputs, ( ) the total cost and 
thi itjw itky
ittc 0α , jα , kβ , jlα , kmβ  and jkδ  the 
parameters to be estimated. itε , the disturbance term of the model, is assumed 
to have two components: 
 
it it itvε µ= +  
 
where,  is the idiosyncratic error and itv itµ  is a time-varying truncated-normal 
random variable which reflects the distance of observations from the cost 
frontier, i.e. the inefficiency term to be estimated. These terms are distributed 
independently of each other and defined as follows: 
 
iµ is iid on 2( , )N µµ σ+  
and 
iv  is iid on 
2(0, )vN σ  
with  
exp{ ( )}it i it Tµ η µ= − −  
 
                                                 
5 See Aigner et al (1977), Berger and Mester (1997), Guarda and Roubah (1999), Turati (2001), 
Bonin et al (2003) for extensive discussions about the SFA method. 
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where, η  is the decay parameter with  the last time period in the  panel. 
When 
iT
thi
η  > 0, the degree of inefficiency is decreasing over time. When η  < 0, 
the degree of inefficiency is increasing over time. We use a time varying model 
instead of a time invariant one to estimate the evolution of the inefficiency 
over the period. We also computed time invariant models to enforce our 
results and found same patterns.6
 
 
4. Data and model specification 
 
The overall sample includes 200 banks: 143 banks from Indonesia and 57 from 
Turkey. We divided the panel in two sub-panels: Panel A for the pre-crisis time 
and Panel B for the post-crisis period. Then, we differentiate the banking 
sector in three groups according to their state, private and foreign ownerships. 
We also build another sub-panel discriminating between large and small banks, 
taking respectively the highest and the smallest quartiles in term of bank’s 
assets to total assets. For each sub-panels, two models are estimated: a Pre-
crisis model using Panel A and a Post-crisis model using Panel B. For 
Indonesia, Pre-crisis period is 1991 to 1996 and Post-crisis period is from 1998 
to 2001. For Turkey, the Pre-crisis begin in 1990 and finishes in 1993. The 
Post-crisis period start in 1995 and ends in 1999. We decided not to take into 
account the year of crisis because of too much macro- and micro-economics 
instability (strong currencies depreciation, persistently high interest rate 
volatility, etc), therefore Indonesia 1997, and Turkey 1994 are excluded from 
the panel. 
 
For Indonesia, the data come from PT Ecofin and from announcement of 
annual financial statements which are published in Bisnis Indonesia Daily. For 
Turkey, the data come from the Banks Association of Turkey Periodical 
Reports: Banks in Turkey, 1997 (for the 1990-1996 periods) and Banks in Turkey, 
2001 (for the 1997-1999 periods). 
                                                 
6 These results are available upon request to the authors. 
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 Table 5 introduces the variables used. Table 6 shows the repartition of 
banks inside the different panels, showing that the Indonesian and the Turkish 
banking sector are similarly built, strengthening the relevance of these 
countries for our study. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 5: Distribution of sample banks by category 
-------------------------------------- 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 6: Description of variables 
-------------------------------------- 
 
The total cost (  is the sum of interest and non interest expenses. There are 
two outputs :  representing the total credits of the type of banks i, 
and regrouping all the others productive assets (the essential part is made 
of cash and securities). There are three input prices ( ) :  is the price of 
labour, measured by the ratio of total salaries and employee benefit expenses to 
total assets (since the information with respect to the number of employees is 
almost completely lacking for most Indonesian banks, we are not able to 
compute the personnel expenses per employees, alternatively, the personnel 
expenses as a fraction of total assets is used);  is the price of physical 
capital, measured by the ratio of total non interest expenses minus total salaries 
and employee benefit expenses over total fixed assets; and finally,  is the 
price of borrowed funds, measured as the total interest expenses over total 
fund borrowed, mainly made of deposits (demand and term) and trading 
account securities. 
)ittc
( )itky 1( )ity
2( ity )
)
)
)
itjw 1( itw
2( itw
3( itw
 
Debate about what constitutes the outputs and inputs in a banking firm is 
still ongoing. In this paper, the intermediation approach is adopted. The bank 
uses labour, physical capital and borrowed funds to produce earning assets (see 
Sealey and Lindley, 1997). This is the most commonly used approach in the 
bank cost function literature. It is also argued that deposits are an input to the 
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production of loans, or alternatively, that they are considered as an output 
because they involved the creation of added value (Berger, Handcock and 
Humprey, 1993). We decide to use them as an input referring to conventional 
accountancy principles7 that put them on the liability side. 
 
 
 
5. Results and interpretation 
 
We focus our work on the variation of the estimated parameters before and 
after the crisis. To support this choice, we run a Chow-type likelihood-ratio 
test (results are reported in table 7) pooling together both samples before and 
after the crisis and comparing them. Both results are positive and enforce thus 
our estimations. This will help us to estimate the influence of a banking crisis 
on banks’ efficiency. We presume that during a banking crisis, ‘bad banks’ 
should be eliminated, leading therefore to an increase in efficiency. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 7: LR-tests for both countries 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of the estimated parameters. On the 
overall, parameters are reasonably consistent with expectations. In most cases, 
the specifications of the factors (inputs and outputs) turned to be statistically 
significant for all groups (state, private and foreign banks) and panels (before 
and after the banking crisis).8
 
Our interpretations focus on table 8 that shows the itµ  for all 
specifications. On the whole, the expected positive effects of crises on each 
country’s global banking sector are unexpected. For all sub-samples, i.e. for all 
type of ownership, and for both countries, the inefficiency is not decreasing 
after the crisis, and more surprisingly, it seems to increase in most of the cases. 
                                                 
7 Our data come from Balance Sheets so accountancy principles have to be applied. 
8 Factor tables are not reported because our study focuses on the inefficiency term. All the 
results can be sent on request to the authors. 
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Looking at the models, small samples and in particular the sub-samples B 
(i.e. before the crises) fit poorly and did not allow us to compare before and 
after the crisis results. However, results for the sector and for private (both 
domestic and foreign owned) banks allows the comparison. Thus we are able 
to distinguish from the sub-sample B if the sectors’ inefficiency is driven by 
private-domestic-foreign or state-owned banks. Not surprisingly, overall 
inefficiency is driven by state-owned banks.9 For both countries, private-
domestic banks are more inefficient than private-foreign owned banks. This 
result in also in contradiction with the literature that call for a Foreign-Owned-
Bank Barriers Hypothesis that did not seems to apply to both countries (see 
Berger, De Young, Genay and Udell, 2000, for a review of this hypothesis). 
This can be explained by the fact that this hypothesis applies for developing 
countries. The focus on emerging economies can explain our results, meaning 
that foreign banks are well run and beneficiate from know-how and from high 
skilled and experienced personnel, leading thus to more efficient work. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 8: Inefficiency scores for samples A & B 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Lastly, looking at the size effect, table 9 shows an interesting pattern. If 
large banks seem to be more inefficient on the overall (inefficiency scores are 
higher for large banks in both countries), the crisis affects countries differently. 
Turkish large banks’ inefficiency decreases after the crisis and small banks’ 
inefficiency increases after the crisis. In other words, it means that even if large 
banks are less efficient, small ones are not better of after the crisis. For 
Indonesia, results are reversed. Inefficiency is slightly increasing for large banks 
after the crisis, and strongly decreasing for small banks. This can be explained 
by the fact that policy responses by Indonesian and Turkish authorities were 
different and this may have impact banks differently.  
 
                                                 
9 Note that for sub-sample B of state-owned Indonesia banks, the estimation reveals a negative 
µ, meaning that the model does not fit for this sub-sample. On the overall, the model fits 
better Turkish banking industry. This may be imputable to the recapitalisation and 
restructuring process, and thus can lead to misinterpretation of the function 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 9: Inefficiency scores for size samples 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Summary and policy recommendations 
 
This study investigates the cost structure of Indonesian and Turkish banking 
industries using a translog cost function to build a stochastic frontier before 
and after the respective banking crises. 
 
Concerning Turkey, our results are consistent with the findings of Yeldan 
(2001), the Banks Association of Turkey (2000) and the Turkish Banking 
Regulation: efficiency did not rise after the crisis. Moreover, inefficiency seems 
to have increase after the crisis. Two major reasons can be suggested: (i) the 
restructuring program seems to have not been properly managed, and (ii) the 
macro-economic environment did not fully recover after the crisis. Finally, our 
findings can be easily linked to the more recent 2000/2001 banking collapse. 
The Indonesian banking sector is also less efficient in the post-crisis period, 
which is also consistent with Levin (1996) and McFadden (1994) 
 
Our major insight is that inefficiency did not decrease significantly after the 
crisis; conversely, it increases after the crisis. To support this conclusion, the 
International Monetary Funds has published, in 1998’s World Economic 
Outlook, a survey showing that Emerging Markets need on average 2.8 years 
to recover – in terms of output growth – from a banking crisis. For Turkey, the 
post-crisis period asked 6 years. For Indonesia, the period after the crisis takes 
only 4 years. This leads us to recommend prudence for Indonesia’s banking 
sector. If it has not dealt with its inefficiency problems, the sector can be 
vulnerable to another banking crisis. 
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APPENDIX 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 1: Budgetary cost of banking crises 
-------------------------------------- 
Source: IMF, Worl Outlook, May 1998 
 
Country Year Budgetary cost and quasi-budgetary cost (% of GDP) 
Argentine 1980/82, 1985 13-55, ... 
Brasil 1994/96 4-10 
Chili 1981/85 19-41 
Colombia 1982/87 5-6 
Spain 1977/85 15-17 
United States 1984/91 5-7 
Finlande 1991/93 8-10 
Indonesia 1994 2 
Japan 1990s 3 
Malaisia 1985/88 5 
Mexico 1994/95 12-15 
Norway 1988/92 4 
Philippines 1981/87 3-4 
Sri Lanka 1989/93 9 
Sweden 1991/93 4-5 
Thaïlande 1983/87 1 
Turkey 1982/85 3 
Uruguay 1981/84 31 
Venezuela 1980/83, 1994/95 ..., 17 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 2: Banking crises and average recovering delay 
-------------------------------------- 
Source: IMF, Worl Outlook, May 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Number of 
crises 
Average recovering delay 
(years) 
Banking crises 54 3,1 
in emerging economy 42 2,8 
in industrialised economy 12 4,1 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 3: RoE and RoA ratios (%) 
-------------------------------------- 
Source : TBB (Turkey) and Ecofin and Indonesian Banking Directory (Indonesia) 
 
    State-owned Private-owned Foreign-owned 
    1991-1995 1996-2000 1991-1995 1996-2000 1991-1995 1996-2000 
RoE Turkey 0,96 0,54 3,24 3,74 6,03 4,92 
  Indonesia -1,3 -0,52 3,06 -0,68 2,35 -0,61 
RoA Turkey 19,82 13,50 43,19 48,45 78,62 68,67 
  Indonesia -20,73 3,47 11,99 -12,41 19,01 89,65 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 4: Structure of Turkish banking sectors 1990/2000 
-------------------------------------- 
Source : BDDK (Turkey) and Ecofin and Indonesian Banking Directory (Indonesia) 
 
  1990 2000 
  Indonesia Turkey Indonesia Turkey 
Number of banks 143 66 151 79 
Number of branches 166 6,560 2314 7,837 
Nombre of ATM - 3,209 5765 11,991 
Number of employees - 154,089 - 170,401 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 5: Distribution of sample banks by category 
-------------------------------------- 
Source: TBB (Turkey) and Ecofin and Indonesian Banking Directory (Indonesia) 
 
Code Category Indonesia Turkey 
1 Public banks 31 12 
  % 21.7 21.1 
2 Private banks 78 30 
  % 54.5 52.6 
3 Foreign banks 34 15 
  % 23.8 26.3 
T Total sample 143 57 
  % 100 100 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 6: Description of variables 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Variable Description 
tc  Total cost : Total value of interest expenses and non interest expenses 
y1 Output (1) Total credits/loans 
y2 Output (2) Other productive assets 
w1 Input (1) 
Price of labour: Total salaries and employee benefit over 
total assets 
w2 Input (2) 
Price of capital: Total non interest expenses minus total 
salaries and employee benefit over total fixed assets 
w3 Input (3) 
Price of funds: Total interest expenses over total funds 
borrowed 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 7: LR-tests for both countries 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 Indonesia Turkey 
LR chi2(20) test 58.75 255.58 
Prob. > chi2 0.000 0.000 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 8: Inefficiency scores for all samples 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Sector Privatly-owned Privatly-owned Privatly-owned State-owned 
        Domestic Foreign     
Indonesia 
(time variant model) 
Before After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
mu 0.94 0.69 7.57 7.64 1.43 6.77 0.20 2.11 -0.18 9.22 
  (1.265) (1.574) (1.405)*** (1.960)*** (1.537) (4.295)** (0.778) (0.875)*** (51.344) (5.242)** 
lnsigma2 2.80 2.73 2.79 2.75 0.09 0.22 -11.79 -1.10 0.18 -0.15 
  (0.113)*** (0.070)*** (0.049)*** (0.059)*** (0.081) (0.160) (1812.988) (0.749)* (4.025) (0.166) 
Observations 919 438 848 570 594 158 234 66 234 61 
Number of groups 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
           
Sector Privatly-owned Privatly-owned Privatly-owned State-owned 
        Domestic Foreign     
Turkey 
(time variant model) 
Before After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  Before  Before  After 
mu 1.87 1.98 0.81 0.83 0.06 2.93 0.41 1.61 9.16 11.95 
  (0.563)*** (0.459)*** (0.333)*** (0.321)*** (0.064) (0.585)*** (0.563) (0.744)** (3.054)**** (2.865)***
lnsigma2 -1.91 -2.03 -2.06 -2.10 -2.92 -2.45 -3.36 -2.58 -2.19 -2.02 
  (0.154)*** (0.157)*** (0.190)*** (0.073)*** (0.163)**** (0.118)*** (0.198)**** (0.171)*** (0.145)**** (0.139)***
Observations 144 271 343 373 75 143 51 68 95 103 
Number of groups 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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-------------------------------------- 
Table 9: Inefficiency scores for size samples 
-------------------------------------- 
 
25% largest  25% smallest  Indonesia 
(time invariant model) Before After Before After 
mu 5.08 5.09 3.70 2.96 
  (1.890)*** (1.836)*** (2.272)* (1.919) 
lnsigma2 2.69 2.68 2.76 2.78 
  (0.122)*** (0.122)*** (0.072) *** (0.089)*** 
Observations 336 340 418 413 
Number of groups 1 1 1 1 
 
25% largest  25% smallest  Turkey 
(time invariant model) Before After Before After 
mu 0.68 0.66 0.27 0.29 
  (0.182)*** (0.189)*** (0.172) (0.169)* 
lnsigma2 -2.03 -1.95 -2.00 -1.96 
  (0.347)*** (0.366)*** (0.141)*** (0.152)*** 
Observations 157 161 142 146 
Number of groups 1 1 1 1 
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-------------------------------------- 
Figure 1: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
-------------------------------------- 
Source: World Bank  
 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
IND(l) TUR(r) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31
-------------------------------------- 
Figure 2: Net Working Capital/Total Assets(%) 
-------------------------------------- 
Source: TBB (Turkey) and Ecofin and Indonesian Banking Directory (Indonesia) 
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-------------------------------------- 
Figure 3: Permanent assets (PA)/Total assets and Non-performing loans (NPL)/Total loans 
-------------------------------------- 
Source : TBB (Turkey) and Ecofin and Indonesian Banking Directory (Indonesia) 
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-------------------------------------- 
Figure 4: Liquidity ratios: Liquid Assets/Total Assets 
-------------------------------------- 
TURKEY 
Source: TBB (Turkey) and Ecofin and Indonesian Banking Directory (Indonesia) 
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-------------------------------------- 
Figure 5: Profitability ratios: Non-Interest Income/Non-Interest Expenses 
-------------------------------------- 
Source: TBB (Turkey) and Ecofin and Indonesian Banking Directory (Indonesia) 
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